Reference Pricing in Health Care: An Inventory of Techniques, and Practical and Policy Implications by Williams, Jackson
Annals of Health Law 
Volume 29 
Issue 1 Winter 2020 Article 7 
2020 
Reference Pricing in Health Care: An Inventory of Techniques, and 
Practical and Policy Implications 
Jackson Williams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jackson Williams Reference Pricing in Health Care: An Inventory of Techniques, and Practical and Policy 
Implications, 29 Annals Health L. 211 (2020). 
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol29/iss1/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Annals of Health Law by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-
library@luc.edu. 
Reference Pricing in Health Care: An Inventory of
Techniques, and Practical and Policy Implications
Jackson Williams*
INTRODUCTION
Reference-based pricing (RBP) is a new and intriguing concept in health
care cost containment.1 For purposes of this article, RBP is defined as any
announced policy by a payor (or benefit administrator) to place a firm limit
on payment for a service or product based upon some reference point.2 Over
the past decade, this strategy has evolved from a fairly simple beginning to
3iterations involving more complex legal and market leverage considerations.
This article describes the various versions of reference pricing and discusses
the different legal and practical considerations that apply. The recent
announcement by CVS Caremark Pharmacy Benefit Management Services
(PBM) that it will marshal the employers it represents to place a limit on
prices of new drugs raises the possibility of payors acting collectively to
impose a reference pricing regime. Needless to say, such an escalation
implicates new questions while offering great promise.
For decades, the dominant model of paying health care providers has been
network contracting, through which payors offer patient referrals in exchange
for an ostensibly discounted price.5 In many regional markets providers have
an edge in contract negotiations.6 In rural areas, a single hospital may have
* Jackson Williams is the Director of Regulatory Affairs and General Counsel at Dialysis
Patient Citizens and received his JD from Loyola University Chicago School of Law. The
author wishes to thank Marilyn Bartlett, Lynn Quincy, and Katie Keith for their advice and
assistance during the drafting of the manuscript.
1 Kenneth B. Berry & Ryan Day, The Evolution of Reference Based Pricing, 56 BENEFITS
MAG. 20, 22 (2019).
2 Jason Shafrin Tihat is Reference Pricing?, HEALTHCARE ECONOMIST (July 28, 2014),
https://www.healthcare-economist.com/2014/07/28/what-is-reference-pricing/. Reference-
based pricing should be distinguished from reference-based contracting. The latter could be
the outcome of the former, i.e., the provider accedes to the reference price proffered by the
payor and signs a contract on those terms; or could result when a reference price is proposed
by a payor without taking the form of an ultimatum. As will be apparent infra, reference-
based contracting does not implicate the legal and practical issues raised by pure reference-
based pricing and is not discussed in this article.
3 See Berry & Day, supra note 1, at 23-24 (discussing the four generations of RBP beginning
in 2009).
4 CVS Health Introduces New Approach to Pricing of Pharmacy Benefit Management
Services, CVS HEALTH (Dec. 5, 2018), https://cvshealth.com/newsroom/press-releases/cvs-
health-introduces-new-approach-pricing-pharmacy-benefit-management
5 A J. CULYER, & J.P. NEWHOUSE, HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS (2000).
6 NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., ADDRESSING PRICING POWER IN HEALTH CARE MARKETS:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OPTIONS TO STRENGTHEN AND SHAPE MARKETS 12 (2015).
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a natural monopoly. 7 In other areas, provider consolidation increasingly
confers monopoly or near-monopoly power on the provider." Some
providers intentionally stay out of networks, perceiving greater negotiating
power when they can hold a balance bill over consumers' heads. 9 Finally,
insurers and employers that want to offer enrollees a broad network, or
perceive a need to include "must-have" providers, essentially handicap
themselves in network negotiations.lO
RPB is seen as a way of overcoming such disadvantages in payor/provider
negotiations.ll In an era of political gridlock, where legislative action is hard
to achieve even under the best circumstances, RBP can be a purely private-
sector activity initiated without legislation. 12 RPB holds the promise of
"bending the cost curve" without the need to enact the global budgets or all-
payor rate setting that have been necessary to contain health care costs in
other countries, or to pursue complex antitrust litigation. 3 Perhaps most
importantly, it addresses the factor that most health care experts believe is
responsible for America's high health care costs relative to similarly situated
nations-excessive provider prices.
14
In a news account describing the state of Montana's use of referenced
pricing for hospital services, a prominent benefits consultant was quoted as
saying, "why wouldn't every single employer do that?""15 This article
explores exactly that question and concludes that further experimentation is
warranted. The analysis will focus on three dimensions on which the legal
and practical difficulties of imposing reference pricing increase as a payor
moves from a position of safety and security toward more daring challenges
to providers. These are summarized in the table below.
Scope: RBP can be applied to specific procedures or products, or across
the board to a given provider type, e.g., hospital services.
Origin of reference: Prices can be set with reference to market conditions,
7 Id. at 11.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 10.
10 SABRINA CORLETTE ET AL., ASSESSING RESPONSES TO INCREASED PROVIDER
CONSOLIDATION IN THREE MARKETS: DETROIT, SYRACUSE, AND NORTHERN VIRGINIA 3
(2018).
11 Id.
12 See generally Berry & Day supra, note 1, at 25 (stating increasing relevance of RBP
simultaneously increased hospitals willingness to negotiate prices or risk losing market
share).
13 Mike Miesen, Bending the Cost Curve with Reference Pricing, HEATH CARE BLOG (June
27, 2013), https://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2013/06/27/bending-the-cost-curve-with-
reference-pricing/.
14 Gerard F. Anderson et al., It's The Prices, Stupid. Why the United States is so Different
From Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFFS. 89, 102 (2003).
15 Julie Appleby, 'Holy Cow'Moment Changes How Montana's State Health Plan Does
Business, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 20, 2018), https://khn.org/news/holy-cow-moment-
change s-how-montanas-state-health-plan-doe s-busine ss/.
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at a level that a known number of providers will accept in full, or with regard
to a normative judgment as to what constitutes an appropriate price.
Payor strength: RBP can be imposed by a small individual payor, a large
payor, or collectively by a payor alliance.
Dimension Less Complexity More Complexity
Scope Shoppable or commodity All services for provider type
services
Origin of Reference Market-referenced Normative-referenced
Payor Strength Large payor Small Payor Multiple Payors
I. EXPERIENCE WITH REFERENCE PRICING To DATE
A. Single-commodity, market-referenced pricing, individual payor:
The CalPERS Initiative
The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), in
association with Anthem Blue Cross in California, introduced the first RBP
program in 2011.16 CalPERS purchases coverage for 1.3 million employees
of the state of California and its governmental subdivisions. 7 The program
initially focused on single hip and knee joint replacement surgery- an
elective, non-emergency procedure that can be scheduled in advance.'
CalPERS set a payment threshold of $30,000, an amount set with reference
to existing market prices and sufficient to cover the procedure at forty-one
hospitals across the state.' 9 Hospitals that were able to provide these services
for a cost at or below the threshold were identified and communicated to the
group's enrollees.
20
Enrollees are liable for the difference between the hospital contracted
charges and the $30,000 threshold should they choose a facility with a price
above it (prices for joint replacement surgery negotiated by CalPERS ranged
from $12,000 to $75,000), which is to say, they can be balance billed.2 ' The
16 Berry & Day, supra note 1, at 22; see also Austin Frakt, How Common Procedures
Became 20 Percent Cheaper for Many Californians, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/upshot/how-common-procedures-got-20-percent-
cheaper-for-many-californians.html (discussing how California has reduced pricing for
common procedures for those insured by the public employees retirement system).
17 Amanda E. Lechner et al., The Potential ofReference Pricing to Generate Health Care
Savings: Lessons from a California Pioneer, HEALTH SYS. CHANGE RES. BRIEF No. 30
(2013), http://hschange.org/CONTENT/1397.
18 Barry & Day, supra note 1, at 22.
19 James C. Robinson & Timothy T. Brown, Increases In Consumer Cost Sharing Redirect
Patient Volumes And Reduce Hospital Prices For Orthopedic Surgery, 32 HEALTH AFFS.
1392, 1393 (2013).
20 Id.
21 Id.
2020
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CalPERS program operates within a preferred provider network, not in lieu
of it as would a narrow network design.22 CalPERS exempts enrollees who
live more than fifty miles from a facility offering the service below the price
limit, or if the patient's physician cites a clinical justification for using a
higher-priced facility.
23
Hip or knee replacements were thought to be good candidates for RBP
programs since they vary in cost within markets without any measurable
difference in quality, their status as "commodities," which is to say,
interchangeability with procedures of the same type, and crucially, the fact
that they are scheduled in advance. 24 CalPERS later added arthroscopic
surgery, cataract surgery, and colonoscopies. 25 Other payors have applied a
similar methodology to other health care commodities: prescription drugs
(RETA Trust, limiting payment to the price of the cheapest medication in
seventy-eight therapeutic drug classes) 26 and imaging (Safeway, limiting
reimbursement to approximately the 60th percentile of the distribution of
prices in 2010).27
Evaluations of these programs have found that:
When faced with paying the excessive rates charged by high-priced
providers, most consumers shift towards lower-priced providers. For
CalPERS, this has occurred for both inpatient and ambulatory surgery.
Other employers have obtained analogous changes in consumer choices
for laboratory tests, imaging procedures, and drugs.
These changes in consumer choices result in reductions in prices and
payments. Some high-priced providers reduce their prices so as to mitigate
the threatened loss of volume. Payments by employers and insurers decline
as consumers shift to providers that charge lower prices.
The application of reference pricing to inpatient orthopedic surgery led to
significant price reductions from some of the hospitals whose initial prices
were above the CalPERS payment limit. The number of California
hospitals charging prices below the CalPERS reference limit ($30,000)
rose from forty-six in 2011 to seventy-two in 2015.28
22 Id. at 1394.
23 James Robinson & Kimberly MacPherson, Payers Test Reference Pricing And Centers Of
Excellence To Steer Patients To Low-Price And High-Quality Providers, 31 HEALTH AFF.
2028, 2033 (Sept. 2012).
24 Barry & Day, supra note 1, at 22.
25 Reference Pricing: Diagnostic Tests and Procedures, BERKELEY CTR FOR HEALTH TECH.,
https://bcht.berkeley.edu/reference-pricing-diagnostic-tests-and-procedures (last visited Nov.
11,2019).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Ann Boynton & James C. Robinson, Appropriate Use of Reference Pricing Can Increase
Value, HEALTH AFFS.: HEALTH AFFS. BLOG, (July 7, 2015),
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Practical considerations: RBP for shoppable commodities represents the
easiest of the techniques discussed in this article. The price is "safe" for
enrollees because there are providers available with prices below the
reference amount.2 9 Limiting application to shoppable services guarantees an
opportunity for the consumer to obtain services without a balance bill,
although consumers might be unpleasantly surprised by a balance bill if they
do not understand the special coverage rule.30 Providers would not want to
be excluded from CalPERS business given its large enrollment. The
arrangements raise minimal legal concerns because, as self-funded ERISA
plans, the state's network adequacy requirements (time, distance) governing
insurance products do not apply.3"
B. All-Provider Type, Market-Referenced Pricing, Individual Payor:
Montana's Employee Health Plan
Montana's Health Care and Benefits Division (HCBD) implemented RBP
for all hospital services in July 2016.32 HCBD's goal was to bring all
hospitals to a narrow range based on the pricing of the lower cost hospitals.3 3
The result was an average of 234 percent of Medicare rates for blended
inpatient and outpatient services. 3 4 While HCBD's RBP is stated as a
multiple of Medicare's prices, in fact its true reference, like CalPERS', is
previously negotiated commercial network rates. However, by linking future
rate increases to Medicare, the price trend is significantly decreased moving
into the future.
As the largest self-funded plan in the state, with 31,000 covered lives,
HCBD's bargaining leverage is comparable to CalPERS'.35 Five of the
hospitals due for a haircut resisted for a while, but all but one capitulated
before the implementation date; the remaining holdout signed on shortly
thereafter.
3 6
Practical considerations: This scenario introduces the "game of chicken"
dynamic. This game-theory concept takes its name and inspiration from the
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10. 1377/hblog20150707.049155/full/.
29 Robinson & MacPherson, supra note 23, at 2029.
30 See generally Lechner et al., supra note 17 (noting few respondents of a survey of
CalPERS enrollees were surprised with the balance on their hospital bill).
31 See generally Appleby, supra note 15 (using Montana as an illustration of the success of
reference pricing when changing state contract with hospitals).
32Id.
33 See id. (reporting that prior to the program all hospitals within the state charged state
employees a varied amount for the same service).
34 See id.; see also Marilyn Bartlett, Direct Administrator of Montana's Health Care and
Benefits Division, Presentation to Colorado Business Group on Health (June 14, 2018)
(Available at http://cbghealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CBGH-June-20 18-Monthly-
Packet.pdf).
35 Bartlett, supra note 34.
36 Appleby, supra note 15.
2020
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mid-20th century hot-rodders' dare: two vehicles hurtle toward each other on
a collision course, each driver publicly vowing not to be the first to swerve.
The driver to swerve first loses face; in the event that neither driver swerves,
both will lose their lives.
Here, the payor has publicly stated an intention not to "swerve" from the
reference price. If providers do not swerve, the payoff is stalemate: plan
enrollees will not have access to non-participating facilities, or will be met
with balance bills. There are enough well-publicized instances of stalemates
between providers and payors in far less fraught circumstances to give one
pause at this possibility.37 If the providers swerve, they communicate
weakness that other payors may be able to exploit. If the payor swerves, the
reference pricing program collapses. As such, the success of this RBP
technique is entirely dependent on provider capitulation.
The inference we can draw from the Montana experience is that the
HCBD, as a large payor representing a sympathetic constituency, had the
greater leverage, both economically and in the court of public opinion. The
providers with above-average prices were disadvantaged by a need to explain
and justify their higher costs.3" Further, not-for-profit hospitals are vulnerable
to allegations that they do not provide a community benefit commensurate
with the revenue that local taxing bodies forego, and officials can challenge
their tax exemptions.39 Hospitals that do not capitulate also face the
likelihood of losing lucrative shoppable services to other providers.40
Ultimately, Montana hospitals felt unable to lock out patients on whose
behalf a seemingly reasonable offer was made. 4' However, a similar scenanio
in North Carolina led to a different result, discussed in Section I.E. infra.42
17 See, e.g., Courtney Tompkins & Melissa Evans, Long Beach Memorial is no Longer In-
Network for Anthem Blue Cross, Stunning Patients, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM,
(updated Sept. 1, 2017, 12:05 PM), https://www.presstelegram.com/2017/08/23/long-beach-
memorial-is-no -longer-in-network-for-anthem-blue -cro ss-stunning-patients/ (reporting
thousands of customers with Anthem Blue Cross insurance lost in-network health services
after contract negotiations ended in a stalemate); see e.g., Matthew Nojiri, Tower Health,
Independence Blue Cross contract stalemate leaves customers in limbo, READING EAGLE
(Oct. 3, 2017, 10:35 AM), http://www.readingeagle.com/news/article/tower-health-
independence -blue-cro ss-contract-stalemate -leave s-customers-in-limbo (reporting
Independence Blue Cross and Tower Health stalled negotiations leaving over 100,000
customers in limbo over health care).
38 See Marshall Allen, In Montana, a Tough Negotiator Proved Employers Don't Have to
Pay So Much for Health Care, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 2, 2018, 5 A.M.),
https://www.propublica.org/article/in-montana-a-tough-negotiator-proved-employers-do-
not-have-to-pay-so-much-for-health-care (discussing how consumers should be demanding
the health care industry justify seemingly arbitrary rising costs).
39Id.
4 0 Id.
41 Id
42 Mark Tosczak, No More Negotiations: State Health Plan Wants Clearer Process, Lower
Prices, N.C. HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2018/11/01/no-more-negotiations-state-health-
plan-wants-clearer-process-lower-prices/.
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C. Single-Commodity, Normative-Referenced Pricing, Individual
Payor: Per-Service Price Caps for Targeted Services in The Oscar
Winski Health Plan
Billing by some providers in particular has raised the ire of payers,
including hospital-based physician practices and air ambulance services,
which often decline to negotiate network contracts; and dialysis facilities.. 
4
All three of these provider types have been the subject of proposed legislation
to cap prices, 44 but some payors have marshaled self-help through reference
pricing for targeted services.
45
By happenstance, the author obtained a document describing the health
benefits offered by the Oscar Winski Company,46 a scrap metal processer in
Lafayette, Indiana with about 250 employees. 47 After a long list of fairly
ordinary exclusions, page twenty-seven contains provisions that essentially
use the Medicare Fee Schedule as reference prices for several services:
55. for charges due to renal dialysis, payment by this Plan will not exceed
100 percent of the Medicare allowance for such incurred expenses;
56. for Hospital Inpatient charges exceeding $25,000, payment will be
limited to the Medicare DRG Rate. If a Medicare DRG Reimbursement
Rate is not available, then reimbursement will be limited to the Rate of the
next closest Hospital;
57. for Outpatient Hospital charges exceeding $10,000, payment will be
limited to the Medicare APC Reimbursement Rate. If a Medicare APC
Reimbursement Rate is not available, then reimbursement will be limited
to the Rate of the next closest Hospital;
58. for Out-of-Network Ambulatory Surgical Center charges exceeding
$5,000, payment will be limited to the Medicare ASC reimbursement fee
schedule;
59. for ambulance (ground and air) charges exceeding $5,000, payment by
this Plan will not exceed 100 percent of the Medicare allowance for such
incurred expenses. Charges include those which relate to 1) transportation
4' Elizabeth Davis, Balance Billing in Health Insurance, VERYWELL HEALTH (Aug. 28,
2019), https://www.verywellhealth.com/balance-billing-what-it-is-how-it-works-1738460.
" Susannah Luthi, Senate Health Bill Includes Pay Cap for Surprise Bill Disputes, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (June 19, 2019, 11:16 A.M.), https://www.modemhealthcare.com/politics-
policy/senate-heath-bill-includes-pay-cap-surprise-bill-disputes.
45 Id.; see Sammy Mack, Fed Up With Traditional Health Insurance, South Florida
Company Tries Something Radical, WLRN (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.wlm.org/post/fed-
traditional-health-insurance-south-florida-company-tries-something-radical (explaining how
employer uses reference-based pricing to save money on the rising cost of health insurance).
46 OSCAR WINSKI CO., OSCAR WINSKI Co. HEALTH PLAN, SUMMARY PLAN 27 (2015) (on file
with author) [hereinafter OscAR WINSKI Co. HEALTH PLAN].
47 OSCAR WINSKI COMPANY, http://www.oscarwinski.com/company (last visited Nov. 14,
2019).
2020
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and 2) medical supplies used during transport, including those for BLS
(basic life support) only services and ALS (advanced life support)
services/supplies;
60. For charges billed on a Form CMS-1500 exceeding $10,000, payment
will be limited to the Medicare fee schedule;
61. For infusion therapy charges exceeding $1,500 (including, but not
limited to, chemotherapy), payment by this Plan will not exceed 100
percent of the Medicare allowance for such incurred expenses. (Infusion
therapy encompasses intravenous and/or intramuscular injections, as well
as drugs administered through other non-oral routes, such as epidural
routes).48
These provisions will have different impacts. At one extreme, dialysis
clinics do not typically balance bill; at the other, air ambulance companies
are notorious for aggressive balance billing and a payor may deem any effort
to avoid it futile. 49 It would seem that in the other instances, this employer
may expect the worker to individually search for providers who will accept
the Medicare amounts or negotiate some type of discount based on the cap
amount.50 One wonders whether the plan administrator assists the workers in
this task. (Note that Lafayette appears to have two competing hospitals).
1. Legal considerations: The MOOP limit
Guidance issued jointly by the U.S. Departments of Labor, Health and
Human Services (HHS), and the Treasury in 201451 addressed the question
of whether reference pricing under the CalPERS model squared with the
Affordable Care Act's Maximum Out-of-Pocket Limit (MOOP). 52 Network
adequacy requirements governing fully-insured products do not apply to self-
insured plans, but the Departments read the MOOP limit as implying a quasi-
network adequacy requirement, articulated as ensuring that a plan "is using
48 OSCAR WINSKI Co. HEALTH PLAN, supra note 46, at 27.
49 See generally Jenny Gold, They May Owe Nothing Half-Million-Dollar Dialysis Bill
Cancelled, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 26, 2019), https://khn.org/news/bill-of-the-month-
half-million-dollar-kidney-dialysis-bill-fresenius-now-zero/ (providing an example of a
dialysis clinic cancelling a patient's bill); Harris Meyer, Air Ambulance Charges Study
Could Boost Senate Surprise Bill Legislation, MOD. HEALTHCARE (July 1, 2019),
https ://www. modemhealthcare. corn/payment/air-ambulance-charges-study-could-boost-
senate-surprise-bill-legislation (noting that in 2016, the national median charges for air
ambulance services were 4.1 to 9.5 times what Medicare paid for the same services).
50 See generally Grace M. Carter, Use of Diagnosis-Related Groups by Non-Medicare
Payers, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 127, 29 (explaining that the most consistent variation
among types of payers concerns how the payment rates are set Medicaid programs which
tend to announce prices according to a fixed rule and that commercial insurers and self-
insured employers tend to negotiate payment rates).
" DEP'T OF LABOR ET AL., FAQs ABOUT AFFORDABLE CARE ACT IMPLEMENTATION (PART
XXI) 1-4 (2014).
52Id. at 2.
Vol. 29
8
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol29/iss1/7
Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences
a reasonable method to ensure adequate access to quality providers at the
reference price."5 Elements of this requirement are:
1. "Plans should have standards to ensure that the network is designed to
enable the plan to offer benefits for services from high-quality
providers at reduced costs and does not function as a subterfuge for
otherwise prohibited limitations on coverage." The Departments
opined that "reference-based pricing that treats providers that accept
the reference amount as the only in-network providers should apply
only to those services for which the period between identification of
the need for care and provision of the care is long enough for
consumers to make an informed choice of provider," that is, to
shoppable services. "Limiting or excluding cost-sharing from
counting toward the MOOP with respect to providers who do not
accept the reference-based price would not be considered reasonable
with respect to emergency services.""
2. "Plans should have procedures to ensure that an adequate number of
providers that accept the reference price are available to participants
and beneficiaries. For this purpose, plans are encouraged to consider
network adequacy approaches developed by States, as well as
reasonable geographic distance measures, and whether patient wait
times are reasonable.
55
3. "Plans should have procedures to ensure that an adequate number of
providers accepting the reference price meet reasonable quality
standards. 56
4. "Plans should have an easily accessible exceptions process," allowing
departures when a provider that accepts the reference price is
unavailable within a reasonable wait time or travel distance or "the
quality of services with respect to a particular individual could be
compromised with the reference price provider. 57
5. Automatic disclosures to enrollees of the pricing structure, "including
a list of services to which the pricing structure applies and the
exceptions process" in the Summary Plan Description; as well as
information upon request about providers accepting the reference
price for each service and about the "process and underlying data used
to ensure that an adequate number of providers accepting the reference
price meet reasonable quality standards. 58
53 Id. at 3.
5 4 Id.
5 5 Id.
561 Id. at 4.
5 7 Id.
5 8Id.
2020
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Essentially, the ruling means that when these conditions are met, providers
that are otherwise in-network can be considered out-of-network for
reference-priced services and the in-network MOOP does not apply.5 9 In a
subsequent "Frequently Asked Questions" release,60 the agencies clarified
that if these requirements cannot be met, a "plan that merely establishes a
reference price without using a reasonable method to ensure adequate access
to quality providers at the reference price will not be considered to have
established a network,, 61, and the plan is "required to count an individual's
out-of-pocket expenses for providers who do not accept the reference price
toward the individual's MOOP limit. 6 2 This essentially forces the plan to
cover costs beyond the limit.
63
Let us imagine an unplanned hospitalization occurring that implicates
paragraph fifty-six of the Winski Summary Plan Description (SPD),
involving hospital inpatient charges exceeding $25,000.64 Per paragraph
fifty-six, payment is to be limited to the Medicare DRG Rate, but this
language is only a starting point.65 Suppose the hospital's charges are
$50,000 and the Medicare fee for the DRG is $10,000. The plan offers to
settle the bill in full for the scheduled amount: $10,000. Under the ACA, the
enrollee is entitled to an annual maximum out-of-pocket cost of around
$7,000.66 Under the common law doctrine of quantum meruit, the hospital is
entitled to its usual, customary and reasonable fee,67 which depends on local
market conditions. Let us say that the hospital's prevailing negotiated rate for
this DRG is $30,000.
The plan cannot leave the enrollee with a balance bill of more than
$7,000,68 nor, likely, would it want to. The plan will pay something between
$17,000 and $30,000 (the UCR should cap the patient's responsibility) with
the precise amount depending on whether the hospital wants to be paid right
away or is willing to pursue litigation. If the hospital is not-for-profit and has
59 Id. at 1-4 (explaining that when the conditions outlined within the FAQs are met, in-
network providers can be considered out of network and the in-network MOOP does not
apply).
6 0 DEP'T OF LABOR ET AL., FAQs ABOUT AFFORDABLE CARE ACT IMPLEMENTATION PART 31,
MENTAL HEALTH PARITY IMPLEMENTATION, AND WOMEN'S HEALTH AND CANCER RIGHTS
ACT IMPLEMENTATION (2016) [hereinafter HHS ACA FAQs PART 31].
61 Id. at 9.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 9-10.
64 OSCAR WINSKI Co. HEALTH PLAN, supra note 46, at 27.
6 5 Id.
66 HHS ACA FAQs PART 31, supra note 60, at 8.
67 Temple Unix. Hosp. Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alts., Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 508 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2003).
68 Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Reference Pricing and Network Adequacy,
HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 12, 2014),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10. 1377/hblog20141012.041924/full/.
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a tax exemption to preserve, and if it does not want to reveal inside billing
information through court discovery, it may accept an amount at the lower
end of the range.
2. Legal considerations: Special rules for dialysis.
Medicare secondary payor (MSP) requirements under section 1862(b) of
the Social Security Act and its implementing regulations restrict health plans
from carving out dialysis for special treatment. 69 These requirements arise
from the status of end-stage renal disease (ESRD) patients as eligible for
Medicare coverage regardless of age; and its interaction with Congress'
policy of maintaining private insurance coverage of ESRD patients for the
first thirty months of their illness.70 In other words, Congress has explicitly
established a regime in which Medicare expenditures are to be reduced by an
offsetting contribution from the private sector.71 Later in Section 2A of this
article the author discuss a related concept, the implicit regime of commercial
insurance reimbursements cross-subsidizing providers for whom Medicare
pays less.
The author, as an advocate for patients with end-stage renal disease, has
seen a proliferation of plan provisions similar to Paragraph 55 of the Winski
SPD, limiting payment for dialysis to 100 percent of the Medicare
allowance.72 Such treatment is clearly unlawful under section 1862(b).73
Section 1395y(b)(1)(C)(i) of the Social Security Act provides that a group
health plan "may not take into account that an individual is entitled to or
eligible for" Medicare benefits based upon end-stage renal disease "during
the [thirty]-month period which begins with the first month in which the
individual becomes entitled to" Medicare hospital benefits or "would have
been entitled to benefits... if the individual had filed an application for such
benefits. 74 Further, section 1395y(b)(1)(C)(ii) provides that a group health
plan "may not differentiate in the benefits it provides between individuals
having [ESRD] and other individuals covered by such plan on the basis of
the existence of [ESRD], the need for renal dialysis, or in any other manner"
during said thirty-month period.75
Pursuantto 42 C.F.R. § 411.108 and 42 C.F.R. § 411.161, actions by group
health plans that take into account "that an individual is entitled to Medicare
69 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (2018).
70 SUZANNE KIRCHHOFF, MEDICARE COVERAGE OF END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE (ESRD) 11
(Congressional Research Service, 2018).
71 See id. at 11 (explaining that a patient with ESRD may remain on private insurance for the
first 30 months after qualifying for Medicare). Later in this article the author discusses a
related concept, the implicit regime of commercial insurance reimbursements cross-
subsidizing providers for whom Medicare pays less.
72 OSCAR WINSKI Co. HEALTH PLAN, supra note 46, at 27.
73 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (2018).
7 4 Id.
7 5Id.
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on the basis of ESRD" are prohibited.76 These actions include "[i]mposing
limitations on benefits for a Medicare entitled individual with ESRD that do
not apply to others enrolled in the plan,"77 such as "[p]aying providers and
suppliers less for services furnished" to an individual entitled to Medicare
than for the same services furnished to a group health plan enrollee who is
not entitled to for Medicare.7"
42 C.F.R. § 411.161(b) also mandates that group health plans "may not
differentiate in the benefits [they] provide between individuals who have
ESRD and others enrolled in the plan, on the basis of the existence of ESRD,
or the need for renal dialysis, or in any other manner., 79 Unlawful conduct
includes actions cited above to the extent they are taken based on the ESRD
health condition. 0
In February 2018, at the urging of the author, the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services' Office of Financial Management sent letters to a
number of plan administrators whose SPDs include language similar to the
Winski plan's Paragraph 55.81 These letters reminded the plan administrators
of the MSP statute and regulations and admonished them to review their plan
benefits to ensure compliance with MSP.
2
D. All-provider type, normative-referenced pricing, individual payor:
Medicare Plus Pricing by small/medium-size employers
A growing number of smaller self-insured employers, working through
independent third party administrators, are unilaterally defining
reimbursements with "scheduled benefits" pegged to the Medicare Fee
Schedule."3 How these plans operate is still unclear-their administrators
view them as proprietary products and are more interested in communicating
their virtues to employers than to the public at large.8 4 Enough information is
available to describe this alternative reimbursement paradigm and analyze its
legal and policy implications.
This model travels under the names of Medicare-Plus and Cost-Plus (on
the assumption that Medicare fees represent facilities' input costs) as well as
76 42 C.F.R. § 411.108 (1995); 42 C.F.R. § 411.161 (1995).
77 42 C.F.R. § 411.108 (1995).
78 42 C.F.R. § 411.161 (1995).
7 9 Id.
80 42 C.F.R. § 411.108 (1995); 42 C.F.R. § 411.161 (1995).
81 See Letter from Steve Forry, Director, Division of MSP Operations, to Kauffman
Engineering Health Plan (Feb. 16, 2018) (on file with author).
82 Id.
83 Melissa Shimizu, Reference-Based Pricing: Another Self-Insured Option for Employers,
Soc'Y HuM. RESOURCE MGMT. (June 5, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-
topics/benefits/pages/reference-based-pricing-is-self-insured-option.aspx; Mike Dendy, The
Rise ofReference-Based Pricing, BENEFITsPRO (Nov. 1, 2017),
http://www.benefitspro.com/2017/1 1/01/the-rise-of-reference-based-pricing.
84 Dendy, supra note 83.
Vol. 29
12
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol29/iss1/7
Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences
Reference-Based Pricing.8 5 As of the publication of this article, only one
journalistic account," and none from health services researchers, of this trend
are available, but the facts can be pieced together from vendor materials that
are fairly candid. 7 The premise of the model is that employers are usually
paying about 300 percent of Medicare in a PPO, but that, as one TPA put it,
"hospitals readily accept 13 0 percent to 15 0 percent of what Medicare would
pay (sometimes less) for those willing to make cash-based payments."8 8
The Medicare-Plus model relies upon a novel additional infrastructure.
The plan must retain lawyers to defend patients in billing litigation,
analogous to the lawyers deployed by liability insurers to defend tort
lawsuits.8 9 The plan must also employ "patient advocates" who try to arrange
care within the price parameters of the scheduled benefit.90
Ideally, the model is accompanied by advance agreements with at least
some facilities to accept the scheduled fees in exchange for referrals, 91 and a
preferred provider network of physicians that leaves the Medicare-Plus
pricing to facilities. 92 The latter PPO would be important because it would
impose some accountability among physicians, who, if sympathetic to an
affiliated facility, could undermine cost savings by increasing referral
volume. 93
Practical Considerations: A Negotiating Advantage From an Inaccessible,
Limited Pot ofMoney?
In Section B, I suggest that one reason Montana was successful in
85 Russell Riebeling, The Fundamental Problem with Reference Based Pricing, REVIVE
HEALTH BLOG (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.thinkrevivehealth.com/blog/fundamental-
problem-reference-based-pricing; Jeff Long, A Different Tactic in the War on Medical
Costs: Reference-Based Pricing, LOCKTON (Mar. 2018),
https://www.lockton.com/whitepapers/LongReference Based PricingExtemalMarch 18
- FINAL.PDF.
86 Mack, supra note 45.
87 See Dendy, supra note 83 (discussing the rise of reference-based pricing); see also
Melissa Shimizu, Reference-Based Pricing: Another Self-Insured Option for Employers,
Soc'Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (June 5, 2018),
https://www. shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/benefits/pages/reference-based-pricing-is-
self-insured-option.aspx (generally describes how reference-based pricing works).
88 Chris Elvidge, Industry Trends: Reference-Based Plan Models, KISTLER TIFFANY
BENEFITS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://ktbenefits.com/2017/1 1/industry-trends-reference-based-
plan-models/.
89 Jon Jablon, You Down with RBP? (You May Already Be!), THE PHtA GROUP BLOG (Nov.
28, 2018), https://www.phiagroup.com/Media/Posts/Postld/794/you-down-with-rbp-you-
may-already-be.
9 0 Id.
91 Len Strazewski, Relieving the Squeeze, ROUGH NOTES (June 28, 2016, 12:44 PM),
http://roughnotes.com/relieving-the-squeeze/.
92 Id.
93 What is Reference Based Pricing?, HOLLOWAY BENEFITS CONCEPTS BLOG (May 15, 2019),
www. hollowaybenefitconcepts.com/what-is-reference-based-pricing.
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implementing its reference-based pricing was its large enrollment.94 But it is
worth considering that the opposite circumstance might be true as well-that
small employers with limited resources have negotiating advantages.
The author's own experience negotiating payments to hospitals
came two decades ago as a plaintiffs personal injury attorney trying
to settle a tort claim and a medical bill at the same time. My clients
often had no health insurance and, in such cases, the proceeds from the
injury claim had to compensate the providers for medical care, my
client for lost wages, and my law firm for our legal work. In these
circumstances, I found hospitals willing to accept a greatly discounted
amount in full settlement in order to expedite payment from a limited
fund over which I was the gatekeeper. 95
The Medicare-Plus model exploits this same circumstance-a limited pot
of money to which the provider has no immediate access-because there is
no network contract and no assignment of benefits.96 These pioneering
payors are daring providers to forego immediate payment for care already
rendered, or to leave a bed unfilled so that they can collect their full charges.
The calculation is that if 120 percent of the Medicare rate is dangled before
them, most providers will not leave the money on the table.97 Because the
employers are relatively small and smaller employers are not typically
thought of as sources of generous coverage, providers may feel they are not
telegraphing weakness by agreeing to the reference price. 98
When comparing the Medicare-Plus model with traditional health
insurance, it is apparent what is being sacrificed to save money: the
convenience and peace of mind associated with a provider network and
predictable out of pocket costs. 99 In a Medicare-Plus plan, a consumer must
sweat out the process of billed charges being negotiated down by the plan
administrator; this could mean delays in arranging necessary procedures, or
calls from bill collectors and adverse credit reports following emergency
encounters. 100 The recent hue and cry over balance billing by out-of-network
94 See generally Allen, supra note 38 (discussing that providers with above-average prices
were disadvantaged by a need to explain and justify their higher costs).
92 Harris Meyer, Hospital develops package prices to lure cash-paying patients, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Feb. 2, 2019),
www.modemhealthcare.com/article/20190202/TRANSFORMATION04/190129925/hospita
1-develops-package -price s-to -lure -cash-paying-patients.
96 Riebeling, supra note 85.
97 See generally Allen, supra note 38 (writing that Montana hospitals did not want to lose
patients to competitors based on a refusal to accept the reference based pricing plan).
98 See generally id. (explaining that the subject of the article, Bartlett, chose the pricing that
she thought was fair and allowed providers to decide whether to work with them rather than
agreeing to the original, high price offered).
99 See generally id. (discussing that employers have historically handed this process over to
insurers to avoid navigating the complicated system of getting in-network discounts and
figuring out pricing).
100 Shimizu, supra note 83.
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physicians at in-network facilities... and over inaccurate provider network
directories102 exemplifies the extent to which consumers have come to expect
that their medical bills will be "taken care of," out of their view. Some
providers, most notably air ambulance services and hospital-based physician
staffing companies, have been more than willing to exploit consumer angst
over bills to pressure insurers.'0 3 One can imagine the trepidation that the first
employee to become ill might feel after his or her company adopts Medicare-
Plus pricing, not knowing whether a local hospital will agree to the plan's
terms. The plan administrator, who would be in the same situation, would not
be able to offer much reassurance.
The employer adopting this approach must inculcate a new mind-set
among employees, that they should not fear pricing confrontations with
providers, but rather embrace them in order to control costs. 10 4 For the many
consumers with high-deductible health plans, hassle-free insurance is already
a distant memory. 10 5 By asking enrollees to shop among providers and
negotiate prices, Medicare-Plus requires more than the typical HDHP, but by
offering assistance in such negotiations, consumers are perhaps better
protected than they are in making other big-ticket purchases such a car and a
home mortgage.
10 6
It is interesting that the Medicare-Plus approach has originated with a few
unheralded benefit advisors and medium-sized businesses, far from
America's elite coastal enclaves and not from the "sophisticated" purchasers
such as CalPERS whose innovations draw regular attention. 107 One wonders
if business owners in struggling rural areas have a different insight into the
level of health care pricing that is realistic for a population of low- and
middle-income workers, or if the experience of seeing health care emerge as
the dominant industry in a small community provokes a unique perspective
on cost growth sustainability. Note that Oscar Winski is in Indiana, which is
said to have among the highest hospital prices of any state.10 8
101 Zack Cooper & Fiona Scott Morton, Out-of-Network Emergency-Physician Bills An
Unwelcome Surprise, 3 75 NEWENGLAND J. MED. 1915, 1915 (Dec. 19, 2016).
102 Michael Adelberg & Michelle Strollo, From Machine-Readable Provider Directories, A
Preview OfA Revolution, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Feb. 27, 2017),
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10. 1377/hblog2Ol70227.058937/full.
103 Kevin Schulman et al., Resolving Surprise Medical Bills, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (July 10,
2019), www.healthaffairs.org/do/10. 1377/hblog20190628.873493/full.
104 Lisa Rapaport, Consumers with High-Deductible Health Plans Could Be Smarter
Shoppers, Bus. INSIDER (Nov. 27, 2017, 1:32 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/r-
consumers-with-high-deductible-health-plans-could-be-smarter-shoppers-2017-11.
1 0 5 Id.
106 Id.
107 INST. HEALTH POL'Y SOLUTIONS, COST MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AND EXAMPLES FOR
THE POOL C- 31 (2005).
108 Shari Rudavsky, High health care costs leave some businesses saying anywhere but
Indiana, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Apr. 29, 2019),
www.indystar.com/story/news/2019/04/29/health-care-costs-indiana-exceed-what-nearby-
states-pay-study-says/3513795002.
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Alternative paradigms such as Medicare-Plus pricing challenge an implicit
assumption made by providers who aggressively apply leverage in contract
negotiations-that the pool of money available to pay them is virtually
unlimited, and infinitely replenishable. In the long run, of course, that is not
the case. By unilaterally limiting the size of the pool, these payors are forcing
the issue.
Legal considerations: Medicare-Plus implicates the same legal
considerations surrounding MOOPS described in the preceding section.
E. All-provider type, normative-referenced pricing, individual payor:
The North Carolina State Health Plan Clear Pricing Project
In October 2018, North Carolina State Treasurer Dale Folwell notified
hospitals of an initiative under which the State Health Plan (SHP) would pay
reference prices set at 155 percent of Medicare for inpatient care, 200 percent
of Medicare for outpatient services, and 160 percent of Medicare for
professional services. 109
Folwell stated that SHP had been paying an average of 158 percent of
Medicare rates for inpatient care (ranging from 85 percent to 318 percent),
291 percent of Medicare for outpatient care (ranging from 145 percent to 803
percent), and 126 percent of Medicare for professional services (ranging
from 65 percent to 994 percent). 110 Across provider types, reference-based
payments would be approximately 177 percent of what Medicare pays."'
Modern Healthcare reported that the figure was calculated by actuaries,
expecting that it would "save the taxpayer-funded state health plan about
$300 million in the first year alone, while reducing plan members' co-
payments and deductibles another $60 million."'" 2 Previously, Folwell
expressed a desire to reduce program expenditures by fifteen percent." 3 On
average, the RBP plan would result in a fourteen percent reduction." 4 What
is interesting about this initiative is its assumption of a normatively "correct,"
if perhaps arbitrary, level of overall spending for a state program-in a sense,
a global budget; as well as a normatively correct level of expenditures on
primary care, which would be increased.
109 Letter from Dale Folwell, Treasurer, State of NC, to Provider Organizations 1,2 (Oct. 3,
2018) (available at https://files.nc.gov/ncshp/documents/shp-
documents/provider reimbursement at apercentatgeof-medicare letter.pdf); see also
Rose Hoban, Treasurer moves forward with health care pricing plan despite uncertainty,
N.C. HEALTH NEWS (May 17, 2019), www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2019/05/17/folwell-
state -health-plan-pricing-changes-uncertainty.110 Id.
... Shelby Livingston, Setting the bar for hospitalprices, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Mar. 2, 2019,
1:00 AM), www.modemhealthcare.com/hospitals/setting-bar-hospital-prices.
112 Id.
113 Tosczak, supra note 42.
114 Bobby Bums, Battle brewing over state health plan, THE DAILY REFLECTOR (Dec. 3,
2018), www.reflector.com/News/20 18/12/03/Battle-brewing-over-state-health-plan.html.
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Practical considerations: The North Carolina Hospital Association
actively opposed the initiative and a bill was offered in the legislature to delay
it." 5 Individually, most hospitals held firm against the Treasurer, refusing to
sign the proffered contracts; in the end, the Treasurer was unwilling to subject
employees to balance billing and "swerved." 1 16 One major difference
between the Montana and North Carolina situations was that Montana
officials had data on hospitals' negotiated rates while North Carolina officials
did not, but it is impossible to say whether this led to the difference in
outcomes. 117 What can be said is that the economic and political strength of
hospitals, which are often the largest employers in their communities, and the
fear of balance billing, constitute potent forces and give hospitals leverage.i"
We will not know if hospitals might have refrained from balance billing after
the reference price was tendered had the Treasurer not folded his cards
months before scheduled implementation. "9 Journalists covering stories on
"surprise medical bills" have observed that providers frequently back down
in the face of media scrutiny of their billing practices. 120 The Treasurer
elected not to test their resolve on this front.
121
F. All-provider type, normative-referenced pricing, insurer: Medicare
Plus Pricing in the BCBS North Carolina "myChoice" Plan.
In 2019, BlueCross BlueShield of North Carolina (BCBS-NC) introduced
a Medicare Plus insurance product dubbed "myChoice. ' ' 122 The product is
offered in partnership with ACS Benefit Services, one of the vendors behind
Medicare-Plus plans in the employer market. 123
While the ACA's Qualified Health Plans-those eligible for subsidies and
115 Shelby Livingston, N.C. walks back reference-based pricing plan for state workers, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Aug. 9, 2019, 4:41 PM), www.modenhealthcare.com/hospitals/nc-walks-
back-reference -based-pricing-plan-state -workers.
116 Peyton Upchurch, State Treasurer Opposes Bill that Would Stop Clear Pricing Project,
THE CAROLINIAN (Mar. 13, 2019). www.carolinianuncg.com/2019/03/13/state-treasurer-
oppo ses-bill-that-would-make -health-care -affordable -for-state -employees.
117 See id. (discussing North Carolina's system); see also Appleby, supra note 15, at 1
(discussing Montana's system).
118 Appleby, supra note 15.
119 Upchurch, supra note 116, at 1.
120 See, e.g., Nisarg A. Patel, Journalism Shouldn't Be a Safeguard Against Unreasonably
High Health Care Bills, SLATE (Oct. 18, 2018, 9:00 AM),
www. slate.com/technology/2018/10/surprise-billing-health-care-joumalism.html (discussing
how media backlash should not be the driving factor behind lowering high health care bills).
121 Upchurch, supra note 119, at 1.
122 Julie Appleby, New Health Plans Expose The Insured To Aore Risk, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Mar. 13, 2019), www.khn.org/news/new-health-plans-expose-the-insured-to-more-
risk.
123 Press Release, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina, New, Lower Cost Plan
Available for Small Businesses and Individuals (Oct. 25, 2018),
http://mediacenter.bcbsnc. com/news/new-lower-cost-plan-available-for-small-businesses-
and-individuals.
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sale in exchanges-are required to have a provider network, the ACA permits
the off-exchange, unsubsidized sale of indemnity-type products. 124 The
myChoice product sets reimbursement at 140 percent of Medicare. 125 BCBS-
NC asserts that "premium savings will equal an average of thirty-three
percent, or $230 per member per month, for individual plans. Premium
savings will equal thirty percent, or $140 per member per month, for small
group plans.' 26
In its promotional materials, BCBS-NC does not guarantee that any
medical provider will accept the Medicare Plus pricing but asserts that
enrollees will receive "personalized support from myChoice Advisors before
and after your doctor visits. '"127 The plan's Summary of Benefits and
Coverage states that "not included in the out-of-pocket limit" are "charges
over the maximum allowable cost" and "balance billing charges.' 2 In its
press release announcing the product, BCBS-NC states that,
[i]f a provider charges more than 140 percent of Medicare for a particular
service, including emergency care, the member may be billed the
difference by the provider and will be responsible for paying the balance
owed. While approved claims go towards satisfying deductibles and out of
pocket maxes, balance billing does not count towards the plan's deductible
or out of pocket max.129
Legal considerations: The author disagrees that this accurately states the
plan's obligations under the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care
Act (ACA). While CMS has not weighed in on the legality of this specific
approach, Section 2707 of the Public Health Service Act, "Comprehensive
Health Insurance Coverage, '"130 requires that any "health insurance issuer that
offers health insurance coverage in the individual or small group market shall
ensure that such coverage includes the essential health benefits package
required under section 1302(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act," which in turn sets an out-of-pocket limit.'3 '
We should first note that as the product pertains to employee coverage,
Section 1302(b) of the ACA, "Cost-Sharing Under Group Health Plans,"3''
would certainly impose the MOOP, making applicable the tri-agency
guidance discussed in Section I.C. above.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 More affordable health care that puts you in control, MYCHOICE,
www.mychoicehealth.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
128 Id.
129 Blue Cross BlueShield of North Carolina, supra note 123, at 1.
130 Patient Protection & Affordable Health Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6 (2014)
[hereinafter ACA].
131 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (a) (2006).
132 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (b) (2006).
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It would appear that BCBS-NC is relying on a creative interpretation of
one or both of two exceptions to the MOOP in asserting that bills above the
140 percent of Medicare threshold are solely the responsibility of the
consumer. Section 1302(c)(3) of the ACA provides that the term "cost
sharing" "does not include premiums, balance billing amounts for non-
network providers, or spending for non-covered services."' 33 At the time the
ACA was enacted, reference pricing did not exist, so balance billing as
understood by the statute's framers would be defined as the difference
between a provider's billed charges and the "usual, customary, and
reasonable' 13 4 amount that insurers typically tender in an indemnity situation.
With the myChoice product, balance billing encompasses not only that
difference, but also the additional difference between the UCR and the
reference price of 140 percent of Medicare.' 35 The intent of the ACA was to
require comprehensive coverage of essential health benefits with a hard limit
on cost sharing for such benefits. 3 6 As such, BCBS-NC's blanket disavowal
of liability for this difference cannot be read as complying with Section 2707
of the Act.
In 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a final rule
promulgating a number of regulations interpreting the ACA. 3 7 One of these
regulations, 45 CFR § 156.130(c), permitted qualified health plans to count
only in-network utilization toward the out-of-pocket limit.'38 With regard to
the individual market, there is no support in the text of 45 CFR § 156.130(c)
for the proposition that an indemnity insurer can unilaterally disavow liability
for balances over a reference price.
First, the title of § 156.130(c) is "Special rule for network plans.' 39
Second, by its own terms, § 156.130(c) has applicability only to "a plan using
a network of providers;' 140 BCBS-NC expressly states that the myChoice
product has "no provider network limitations" and "no restrictions on which
providers a customer can see.' 141 Finally, in its discussion of § 156.130(c) in
the 2013 Final Rule, HHS said its rationale for § 156.130(c) was that its
"research has shown that generally, health spending occurs in-network."' 142
This rationale does not apply to a Medicare-Plus indemnity product.
As such, the author's view is that BCBS-NC must make the same efforts
133 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (c)(3) (2006).
134 UCR (Usual, Customary, and Reasonable), HEALTHCARE.GOV,
www.healthcare.gov/glossary/ucr-usual-customary-and-reasonable (last visited Nov. 14,
2019).
135 MyChoice, supra note 127, at 1.
136 ACA, supra note 130.
137 ACA, supra note 130; 78 Fed. Reg., 12833-47. (Feb. 25, 2013).
138 78 Fed. Reg., 12833-47. (Feb. 25, 2013).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina, supra note 123.
142 ACA, supra note 130.
2020
19
Williams: Reference Pricing in Health Care: An Inventory of Techniques, and
Published by LAW eCommons, 2020
Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences
to negotiate, and if necessary, litigate lower provider bills on the enrollee's
behalf that are described in Section I.C. above, and that North Carolina's
insurance commissioner erred in approving BCBS-NC's forms' assertions
with regard to balance billing.
Practical considerations. While the author believes that this product must
provide full MOOP protection, the fact that it is marketed without promising
such protection will discourage its purchase by consumers with assets to
protect. North Carolina's homestead exemption is limited to $35, 0 0 0 ; 143 a
consumer with a lot of home equity, or who owns business or agricultural
property, would be a tempting target for a hospital inclined to file a lawsuit
pursuing its full chargemaster rates in the event of an unplanned inpatient
episode.
G. Single commodity, normative-referenced pricing, multiple payor:
The CVS Caremark Initiative
In August 2018, the pharmaceutical benefit manager (PBM) CVS
Health announced a program that allows self-funded plan sponsors "to
exclude from coverage medications that have launch prices of greater than
$100,000 per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY)" as determined by the
Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER).14 4 CVS Health states
that a "pharmaceutical company will know exactly where the price must be
set for a drug to be included as a covered benefit," so therefore, under the
policy it will be
[T]he pharmaceutical manufacturer that is determining access to the
medication by its choice of a launch price. Some pharmaceutical
manufacturers may initially prefer to price high and risk limiting access.
But over time, as more payors adopt this program or ones similar to it, the
logic of the market will dictate more reasonable launch pricing overall. 145
In effect, the program sets a QALY-referenced price.
This concept differs from the reference pricing programs described above
in that it uses neither a Medicare price nor a point on a range of commercial
prices for its benchmark. The concept introduces three new elements: first,
rather than action by an individual payor, an action by multiple payors acting
collectively through an agent (the PBM); second, a cost-effectiveness
concept, the QALY, in which the price is tethered to a unit of health outcome
rather than the unit sold; and third, an assessment by a party other than
government or markets. Each of these elements represents a new milestone
on the march of reference pricing. Taken together, they suggest a bold new
143 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1C-1601(a)(1).
144 Troyen Brennan & Surya Singh, Why CVS Is Giving Plans A New Tool To Target High
Launch Prices, HEALTH AE. (Sept. 17, 2018)
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10. 1377/hblog20180913.862850/full/.
1 4 5 Id.
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future for the concept that some might see as logical next steps and others
might see as oppressive or presumptuous.
1. Collective Action By Payors
A reference pricing program in which multiple payors participate is more
likely to be effective in bending the cost curve, but is also more likely to draw
a legal challenge on antitrust grounds.
Practical Considerations: Multi-Payor Cooperation.
As a PBM, CVS Health is in a position to coordinate the effort of multiple
client-employers to force down drug prices.146 No individual payor need stick
out its neck as the first mover and potentially scare off risk-averse incumbent
or prospective employees. CVS Health can sign up employers and unions
conditionally and confidentially before going live and ensure that a critical
mass of payors are participating. Since there is nothing stopping other PBMs,
payors, or groups of payors from independently adopting the same strategy,
the mere fact of the CVS announcement sets in motion a powerful collective
dynamic that empowers payors to force drug prices down. The "game of
chicken" between individual drivers is replaced by the equivalent of a
squadron of tanks barreling toward a lone, very vulnerable, drag racer. The
ability of drug manufacturers to charge exorbitant prices is almost entirely
dependent on their access to the large sums of money pooled within insurance
plans. 47 If access is denied, very few Americans could be expected to
purchase them with their own money.
148
Legal considerations: Antitrust issues
What CVS Health proposes is in the nature of a joint purchasing
cooperative. The author, as a health policy generalist, claims no expertise in
antitrust law so the discussions of this topic below will be relatively brief and
perhaps superficial.
Antitrust rulings to date have been favorable to the PBM business model,
146 See Cole Werble, Pharmacy Benefit Managers, HEALTH AFF. (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10. 1377/hpb20171409.000178/full/ (stating "... . from the
payer perspective, PBMs have standing with pharmaceutical industry in price negotiations").
147 See NAT'L ACAD. Sci. ENG'G, & MED., MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL
IMPERATIVE 89 (Norman R. Augustine, et al. eds., 2018) (writing that "[Drug]
[mIanufacturers commonly sell their products at discounted prices... In concept these
discounts are passed through (at least in part) from the PBMs to the consumer via the
consumer's prescription drug insurance plans... However, it is not clear that this occurs in
practice.").
148Cf id. at 15-16 (providing an example of how much an individual with healthcare
insurance pays for a medication); Laura Entis, Tihy Does Medicine Cost So Much? Here's
How Drug Prices Are Set, TIME MAG. (Apr. 9, 2019), https://time.com/5564547/drug-prices-
medicine/ (stating "as it exists today, the system is not designed to prioritize savings
for patients").
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brushing aside suggestions that monopsony or oligopsony purchasing by
PBMs violates the law. 149 These rulings rejected allegations of antitrust
injury by pharmacies that distribute drugs and as such are not entirely on
point with the potential grievance of a drug manufacturer. Nevertheless, the
rulings' rationales offer considerable support for the CVS Health proposal.
In approving the Medco/Express Scripts merger in 2012, the Federal Trade
Commission "considered whether the acquisition would confer monopsony
power on the merged company when it negotiates dispensing fees with retail
pharmacies."'"5 The Commission stated: "As a general matter, transactions
that allow firms to reduce the costs of input products have a high likelihood
of benefitting consumers, since lower costs create incentives to lower prices.
Only in special circumstances does an increase in power in negotiating input
prices adversely impact consumers. '151 The Commission found that the
resulting larger PBM would not have sufficient market share to constitute a
monopsony, but even
[I]f the transaction enables the merged firm to reduce the reimbursement
it offers to network pharmacies, there is no evidence that this would result
in reduced output or curtailment of pharmacy services generally.
Furthermore, for contractual and competitive reasons, it is likely that a
large portion of any of these cost savings obtained by the merged company
would be passed through to the PBM's customers. Although retail
pharmacies might be concerned about this outcome, a reduction in
dispensing fees following the merger could benefit consumers by lowering
health care costs.
152
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
expressed approval of PBMs' purchasing power in finding that it did not
constitute a "naked horizontal price-fixing agreement" and therefore a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. 15 In North Jackson Pharmacy v. Caremark Rx
Inc., the court found that Caremark (predecessor to CVS Health) "is
essentially a cooperative purchasing group," and analyzed its activities under
the "ancillary restraints" doctrine-that is, were Caremark's restraints on
trade "part of a larger endeavor whose success they promote." 154 While naked
restraints "are unlikely to have any redeeming value and so are usually
accorded per se treatment... ancillary restraints that may contribute to the
success of a cooperative venture that promises greater productivity and
149 See generally, PHARM. CARE MGMT. Assoc., ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS OF PROPOSALS
TO LIMIT REBATES 3-5 (2018) (stating that the court did not "condemn the use of rebates"
which led to current use of rebates) [hereinafter PCMA].
150 Statement Concerning the Proposed Acquisition of Medco Health Solutions by Express
Scripts, Inc., FTC File No. 111-0210, F.T.C., (2012).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 N. Jackson Pharmacy, Inc. v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 740, 745 (2005).
154 Id. at 746-47.
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output" will be upheld if reasonable.'55 The question was framed as "whether
[a PBM acts] in a procompetitive, efficiency-enhancing manner that benefits
consumers, or whether instead that goal is accomplished through unlawful
collusion that drives prices below competitive levels and thereby reduces
social welfare.' 56
While the decision discussed here was not a ruling on the merits, the
pharmacies' litigation has petered out and it would be fair to say that PBMs'
general business model is lawful. Does this imply that using the PBM
structure to coordinate reference pricing is also lawful? At least two elements
of the rulings raise distinctions that drug manufacturers could point to.
First, the Northern District observed that Caremark's contracting with
pharmacies was one of ostensibly interrelated functions in the administration
of Plan Sponsors' drug benefit plans "includ[ing] not only the negotiation of
reimbursement rates with retail pharmacies but also the processing of
reimbursement claims, maintenance of patient records, design and
management of drug formularies, negotiation of manufacturer rebates and
maintenance of a mail order pharmacy. 5 7 A drug manufacturer could argue
that reference pricing represents a significant departure from these functions.
Second, the FTC has observed that:
In conventional monopsony and oligopsony models, all sales take place at
a single price. A reduction in price is associated with a movement
downward along the supply curve to a lower quantity. By contrast, each
contract between a PBM and a pharmacy company is subject to individual
negotiation. Both the PBM and the pharmacy have the incentive to contract
for the efficient quantity, while bargaining on the price in order to
determine how the gains from the tmnsaction are divided between them.
In this situation, an increase in the bargaining power of the buyer may lead
to a lower price, but there is no reason to expect a lower price to lead to a
lower quantity.158
Drug manufacturers could argue to a court or to the FTC, as they have
argued to Congress and the public, that forced price reductions will lead to
the development of fewer new drugs. 5 9 However, because CVS will merely
be trying to impose the same QALY-based restrictions in the US that are
ubiquitous in the rest of the world, Pharma would be placed in the awkward
position of telling courts and regulators that higher prices in the US, alone,
155 Id. at 747.
156 Id. at 749.
157 Id. at 748.
158 Statement In The Matter Of Caremark Rx, Inc./Advancepcs, File No. 031 0239, F.T.C.
(2004) 1, 3 n.4.
159 Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Big Pharma's Go-To Defense of Soaring Drug Prices Doesn 't Add
Up, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/03/drug-prices-high-cost-research-and-
development/585253/.
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are necessary to guarantee innovation.
Finally, we should take note of what might be called the "healthcare-is-
complicated" disclaimer that is found in the joint DOJ-FTC antitrust
statement: "These principles are sufficiently flexible to take into account the
particular characteristics of health care markets and the rapid changes that
are occurring in those markets,' 160 as well as Justice Breyer's observation
that "the subject matter of the present agreement-medical costs-is an area
of great complexity where more than solely economic values are at stake."' 6'
Clearly, judges and regulators understand the intractability of the health care
cost problem and seem reluctant to step in to protect any entity from
purchasing techniques that might curb those costs.
2. QALY As The Unit of Pricing.
RBP to date has assumed that items' prices will be stated in the units
sold, 16 2 e.g., $30,000 for a joint replacement procedure,' 163  $1,500 for a
colonoscopy, 164 or $12.30 for a thirty-day supply of statins. 165 While price
may be set at percentile of a negotiated commercial reimbursement range or
multiple of Medicare prices, the denominator in each instance is the unit by
which the item is usually sold.
16 6
The denominator in a QALY is the gain in a patient's longevity adjusted
by reduced quality-of-life. 167 ICER evaluations produce prices at which
treatments would be considered cost-effective at willingness-to-pay
thresholds of $50,000/QALY, $100,000/QALY, and $150,000/QALY. 168
ICER states a "value-based benchmark price for a drug," defined as the "care
value price range that would achieve cost-effectiveness ratios between
$100,000 and $150,000 per QALY gained.' 69 CVS Health is applying its
own value judgment in choosing the $100,000/QALY benchmark.170 It notes
160 STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, DOJ & FTC (Aug.
1996).
161 Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 931 (1st Cir. 1984).
162 PCMA, supra note 149, at 5.
163 Ralph Weber, Reference Based Pricing in 2018, MEDIBID (Nov. 2, 2018),
https://www.medibid.com/blog/2018/1 I/reference-based-pricing-in-20 18/.
164 Berry & Day, supra note 1, at 22.
165 Ross J. Simpson et al., Cardiovascular and Economic Outcomes After Initiation of Lipid-
Lowering Therapy With Atorvastatin vs Simvastatin in an Employed Population, 84 MAYO
CLINIC 1065, 1071 (2009).
166 PCMA, supra note 149, at 5.
167 Franco Sassi, Calculating QALYs, comparing QALY and DALY calculations, 21 HEALTH
POL'Y PLAN. 402, 403 (Sept. 2006).
168 INST. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REVIEW, PCSK9 INHIBITORS FOR TREATMENT OF HIGH
CHOLESTEROL: EFFECTIVENESS, VALUE, AND VALUE-BASED PRICE BENCHMARKS 20 (2015).
169 Id. at 77.
170 Ami Gopalan, CVS Announcement of Cost-Effective Benchmark Puts ICER in the
Spotlight, STAT NEWS (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/08/22/cvs-cost-
effectiveness-benchmarks-puts-icer/.
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that this is approximately double the benchmark applied by European
nations, 171 preserving a measure of "American exceptionalism" with this
judgment.
Value-based insurance designs (V-BID) that align a patient's cost sharing
to a normative judgment of the value of the underlying service are currently
undergoing testing.172 Pricing per QALY for drugs suggests the possibility of
V-BID pricing for procedures in the future.
3. Independent Body as Evaluator of Value
Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER) describes itself as:
[A]n independent and non-partisan research organization that objectively
evaluates the clinical and economic value of prescription drugs, medical
tests, and other health care and health care delivery innovations. ICER
conducts rigorous analyses of all clinical data and publicly convenes key
stakeholders - including patients, doctors, life science companies, private
insurers, and the government - to translate this evidence into policy
decisions that lead to a more effective, efficient, and just health care
system.1
73
As a creature purely of civil society, not the government, its authority and
legitimacy must be earned by the expertise of its staff and independent voting
committees, and the fairness and representativeness of its processes. To the
extent that ICER is viewed as a fair and neutral arbiter its valuations could
be perceived as more legitimate and less capricious than those set unilaterally
by a payer.
II. THE FUTURE OF REFERENCE BASED PRICING
From a modest beginning nine years ago, reference pricing techniques
have evolved to encompass more services, more providers, more payors, and
more dollars of health care expenditures. In particular, the three new elements
introduced by the CVS Health initiative, if brought to scale across the full
landscape of US health care delivery, could bring paradigmatic change to the
leverage of payors vis a vis providers.
To quote the prominent benefits consultant from Montana, "Why wouldn't
everyone do it?' 174 Could large payors use reference pricing to ratchet
reimbursements down to 125 percent of Medicare as some small payors have
done? Could small payors combine to force reference pricing on high-cost
171 Brennan & Singh, supra note 144, at 2.
172 See Mark A. Fendrick et al., Value-Based Insurance Design: More Health at Any Price,
47 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 404, 407-8 (2012) (stating that "[t]here is a dearth of data... of
evaluations of V-BID programs").
173 About ICER, INST. FOR CL[NICAL & ECON. REVIEW, https://icer-review.org/about/ (last
visited Nov. 14, 2019).
174 Appleby, supra note 15.
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providers?
A. Reference-Based Prices and Administered Prices
The Medicare-Plus model superficially resembles proposals from Robert
Berenson and from Dartmouth researchers to set government-mandated
upper limits on reimbursements pegged to a multiple of the Medicare Fee
Schedule. Berenson's version contemplates a ceiling in the range of 200 to
250 percent of Medicare, intended as a backstop to negotiations rather than a
final price. 175 The Dartmouth proposal would give "every patient and every
insurance company.. the option of paying 125 percent of the Medicare price
for any service.' 176 Such proposals are calls for all-payor rate setting, a form
of administered prices.
RBP share some similarities with administered pricing systems.
Medicare's system of administered prices uses formulas loosely based on
input costs to set fees on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis for providers wishing to
serve Medicare beneficiaries. 77 Because the Medicare population represents
the vast majority of patients for certain types of care-in particular, hospital
inpatient and dialysis services--essentially all providers of such services
must accept these fees. A minority of physicians decline to participate in
Medicare, but not enough to threaten beneficiaries' access to care. 17
Medicare's Prospective Payment Systems are designed to cover input costs
for an "efficient" provider, not for any provider, an arrangement intended to
encourage lean operations.
The state of Maryland has a system of all-payor rate-setting for hospitals,
to which has recently been added a global budget for all hospital services in
the state. 179 Rates are set by the state Health Services Cost Review
Commission.i s° As with Medicare, hospitals are required to file cost reports
and rates are updated annually."8
Britain has what amounts to an administered pricing system for drugs
since all of its citizens receive health coverage through the government-run
175 Robert Berenson, Addressing Pricing Power in Integrated Delivery: The Limits of
Antitrust, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 711, 738 (2015).
176 Jonathan Skinner et. al., The 125 Percent Solution: Fixing Variations In Health Care
Prices, HEALTH AF. (Aug. 26, 2014),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10. 1377/hblog20140826.041002/full/.
1 7 7 
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, PAYMENT BASICS: HOSPITAL AcuTE INPATIENT
SERVICES PAYMENT SYSTEM 3 (2018) [hereinafter MEDPAC PAYMENT BASICS].
1 7 8 
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE
PAYMENT POLICY 110 (2017) [Hereinafter MedPAC MPAC REPORT].
179 Gerard Anderson & Bradley Herring, The All-Payer Rate Setting Model for Pricing
Aedical Services and Drugs, 17 AMA J. ETHICS 770, 772 (2015).180 Id.
181 See id. ("Maryland has used a prospective annual global budget that requires each
hospital to monitor both the number of admissions and the cost per admission").
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National Health Service (NHS). 18 2 Britain's National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence (NICE) makes recommendations on which drugs NHS must
cover based upon clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness analysis.'8 3
NICE generally will not approve drugs with a value of less than £30,000 per
QALY. 184
Reference pricing resembles administered pricing in that it purports to
offer a "take-it-or-leave-it" price. 8 5 It can further resemble administered
pricing if it uses an administered price, such as Medicare's, as a reference
point, or if it purported to set prices based upon input costs as do Medicare
and Maryland. Ultimately, if all payors used the same reference pricing
system, the RBP could become a defacto, virtual administered price.
It is important to note that a government-mandated administered price
offers a consumer protection that reference pricing does not: as part of the
take-it-or-leave-it terms, a government entity can require that the provider
accept the payment in full satisfaction of the patient's obligations, thereby
prohibiting balance billing. 86 Effective in 2019, Oregon imposed a system
of administered prices on hospitals serving the 136,000 state employees and
dependents covered by its Public Employees Benefit Board (PEBB) pegged
at 200 percent of Medicare. 87 In testimony to the House Committee on
Health Care, Speaker Tina Kotek noted that "the current average
inpatient/outpatient cost for the self-insured plans is approximately 237
percent of Medicare.' 8 8 The bill targets 200 percent for in-network claims
because it is an achievable benchmark that still moves us in the right
direction. '189 She further observed:
[A recent study] found the cost of health care in Oregon is seventeen
percent higher than neighboring states with no correlating increase in the
quality of care. In 2016, there was an 8.1 percent increase in medical costs
across all PEBB plans compared to the previous plan year. Mercer
actuaries determined that 3.4 percent of the self-insured cost increases
were due to simple increases in the service cost-not increases in
182 David A. Wong, Rationing Treatments Based on Their Cost per QALY, 13 VIRTUAL
MENTOR 220, 221 (2011).
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Pamela Rich, Reference-Based Pricing: Creating Health Care Shoppers, 30 BENEFITS Q.
25, 27 (2014).
186 MPAC PAYMENT, supra note 178, at 110.
187 Oregon Legislative Assembly, Staff Measure Summary: SB 1067 A, 5 (2018),
https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PEBB/docs/OEBB-
PEBB/o20lnnovationo20Workgroup/20181016/IW 0 o2OAttachment%/0204c-SB 106-
HB34 180o20summaries%/o20and%/o20testimony.pdf; Julie Appleby, Health Plans For State
Employees Use Medicare's Hammer On Hospital Bills, KAISER HEALTH NEWs (Mar. 21,
2019), https://khn.org/news/health-plans-for-state-employees-use-medicares-hammer-on-
hospital-bills/.
188 Oregon Legislative Assembly, supra note 187, at 5.
189 Id.
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utilization or risk. 190
Other efforts to impose administered prices have faltered. In 2019,
Colorado Insurance Commissioner Michael Conway's office proposed a
reinsurance program to reduce premiums in the individual market by, among
other things, cutting $215 million to $245 million in hospital costs by limiting
claims to low multiples of Medicare rates. 191 Both the state legislature and
the Trump Administration rejected the plan in April 2019.192 Just days earlier,
the Montana legislature rejected House Bill 747, which would have set a
ceiling on hospital rates pegged to the Health Care and Benefits Division's
reference-based pricing. 193
In arguing for a cap on payments at 125 percent of Medicare rates,
Skinner, Fisher, and Weinstein note several advantages to using Medicare as
a benchmark: while "not perfect ... it is uniform across regions, with a cost-
of-living adjustment that pays more in expensive cities and less in rural
areas."' 194 With a twenty-five percent premium added there would be
sufficient incentives for providers "to see new patients and help offset the
inadequate Medicaid payments provided in many states. 195 Furthermore,
most negotiated payments are already under the 125 percent of Medicare cap,
so those payments would be entirely unaffected by this new policy.'
196
As noted earlier, the Medicare-Plus approach assumes that Medicare fees
reflect facilities' input costs. Many providers would disagree with this
proposition, and indeed prospective payments are supposed to be set at the
level of an "efficient" provider. 197  The Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission (MedPAC) acknowledges that most hospitals have negative
Medicare margins and thrive based upon more generous commercial
reimbursements, but has identified a subset of efficient hospitals that deliver
high-quality care with positive Medicare margins. 198 MedPAC summarizes
its conclusions in a pithy formulation, "high pressure = low cost, ' ' 199 that is,
facilities facing fiscal pressure due to low commercial reimbursements will
evolve to deliver care at lower costs. Noteworthy in this regard is survey
findings from consultancy firm Kaufman, Hall & Associates, which reports
190 Id. at 5-6.
191 LEWIS & ELLIS ACTUARIES, COLORADO REINSURANCE PROGRAM ANALYSIS PREPARED FOR
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES 6 (2019).
192 Remarks of Commissioner Michael Conway to the NAIC Regulatory Framework Task
Force, Apr. 6, 2019. CMS would have had to approve a State Innovation Waiver.
193 Montana House Bill 747 (Adjourned Sine Die), LEGISCAN,
https://legiscan.com/MT/bill/HB747/2019 (last visited Nov. 14, 2019); See H.B. 747, 66th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2019) (detailing H.B 747).
194 Skinner et al., supra note 176.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 MPAC REPORT, supra note 178.
199 Id. at 87.
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that sixty percent of hospital executives say their internal cost-cutting goal
is, or should be, "achieving revenue/expense breakeven with Medicare. '"200
B. How Could Payors Lawfully Coordinate a Joint Reference-Based
Pricing Regime?
1. Joint Purchasing Monopsony Antitrust Considerations
The collapse of the Clinton Administration's 1993-94 Health Security Act
proposal, which featured mandatory state-based purchasing alliances as its
primary cost containment mechanism, spurred a boomlet of legal scholarship
inquiring whether private-sector analogs to those purchasing alliances would
pass antitrust muster or be struck down as unlawful monopsonies. Ironically,
joint purchasing at the scale discussed in these works never came to pass over
the succeeding quarter-century. Nevertheless, the analyses they presented are
helpful to understanding the legal ramifications of collective purchaser action
to impose reference pricing.
Both authors discussed hereafter were sanguine about legal prospects for
employer collective action.20 1 Havighurst noted that antitrust enforcement
officials "have evinced a positive disposition toward collective
purchasing of health care... [b]ecause joint purchasers are generally
perceived as fighting battles to control the cost and improve the quality
of health care and as seeking to bring a semblance of price competition
to markets that have long lacked it."202 He concluded that "few employer
coalitions or purchaser cooperatives are likely to cross the lines laid down
by antitrust law,' 20 3 and that "courts could be persuaded to tolerate some
monopsonistic joint purchasing in the health care sector. "204 Miller
concluded:
Properly structured and analyzed, collective action by health
insurance buyers need not present significant antitrust risk... In point
of fact, courts have generally treated large health sector purchasers
or purchasing coalitions quite leniently in antitrust cases, even in the
absence of facilitating legislation. This coincides with a legal
perception that, notwithstanding pure economic theory (which tends
to treat monopsony and monopoly as two sides of the same
anticompetitive coin), buyer power does not generally present the
2oo LANCEB. ROBINSON ET AL., 2018 STATE OF COST TRANSFORMATION INU.S. HOSPITALS
AND HEALTH SYsTEMs: TIME FOR BIG STEPS 26(2018).
201 Clark C. Havighurst, Antitrust Issues in the Joint Purchasing of Health Care, 1995 UTAH
L. REv. 409 (1995); Frances Miller, Health Insurance Purchasing Alliances: Monopsony
Threat or Procompetitive Rxfor Health Sector Ills?, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1546 (1994).
202 Havighurst, supra note 201, at 412.
203 Id. at 413.
204 Id. at 424.
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same risks to consumer welfare as does seller domination.20 5
Havighurst's article suggests several questions relevant to a court's or
regulator's inquiry, each of which he suggests can be answered with facts
favoring permissive treatment.20 6
Would the exercise of monopsony power exploit providers and extract
"producer surplus" they rightfully earned? Havighurst argues that a case can
be made that employers collectively purchasing health care "truly
represent community interests, including the interests of consumers
concerned about the quality and accessibility as well as the cost of health
care,'2°7 and would likely be viewed "sympathetically by antitrust
enforcers, juries, and judges if they appeared to be acting as agents of
their workers. 20 8
Could the collective action achieve allocative efficiency, that is, reduce
prices without unduly reducing output? Havighurst notes that:
[T]he policy objections to the exercise of monopsony power are somewhat
weaker in the case of health services than in other markets. Indeed, it
cannot be assumed that any output reductions resulting from health care
purchaser collaboration would represent a loss of efficiency in resource
allocation... As it currently operates, the market for health coverage is
widely suspected of causing an overcommitment of resources to health
care uses .... Purchasers may therefore actually desire to reduce supply
and to discourage of new investment. 20 9
With regard to private antitrust enforcement, would aggrieved providers
be able to prove an "antitrust injury"? "[It] might be argued that health care
providers challenging joint purchasing of health services have suffered
no antitrust injury because they are seeking only to restore the
uncompetitive conditions that generally prevail with respect to price and
utilization in markets for insured fee-for-service health care. 2 10
The Havighurst article lays out a sort of road map for organizing and
justifying a collective action project to make it more likely to survive legal
challenges:
* Avoiding a naked agreement to fix prices. 211
* Preserving employer and patient choice. Havighurst notes the
approval given by the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust
205 Miller, supra note 201, at 1551.
206 Havighurst, supra note 201.
2
17 Id. at 446.
208 Id. at 420.
2
19 Id. at 422-23.
21 1Id. at 418.
211 Id. at 425.
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Division to a joint purchasing proposal by the Bay Area
Business Group on Health. The employers, rather than
"promis[ing] providers exclusive access to its members'
employees as a reward for agreeing to the group's terms... left
each employer free to choose the specific HMOs (among
thirty-five with which the coalition proposed to negotiate) that
it would offer its employees at coalition-negotiated prices.. In
addition, the group would not boycott HMOs that refused to
negotiate or did not come to terms. 212
* Retaining point-of-service options, such as "a preferred-
provider strategy to ensure consumer choice would not be
limited unnecessarily," permitting employees to pay extra for
higher-priced providers.2 13
* Asserting a "market-failure remedy" defense that "efficiencies
outweigh modest anticompetitive effects. '214  The project
could claim "that the restraint was well calculated to overcome
a demonstrable market failure not readily correctable by other
(including legislative) means. While such a market 'failure'
defense has no real support in case law, courts have never
declared all naked restraints to be illegal per se. If in fact the
law permits some purposeful interferences with competition,
the question arises: which ones? It is at least arguable that a
restraint should be allowed if it could reasonably be expected
to produce results actually closer to the efficient result that the
market would yield if it functioned smoothly, unimpaired by
market failure.12 15
2. A Concept for Bringing Reference Pricing to Scale in a High-Cost
Market: The Local Healthcare Market Payment Advisory
Commission
I introduce here a concept that could operationalize the Havighurst
prescriptions: a Local Healthcare Market Payment Advisory Commission.
Like the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, it would bring data-
driven economic analysis to bear in recommending prices that lower payor
costs while remaining adequate to ensure access to care. Like the community
health planning model that is used in Rochester, NY ,216 it would be a
cooperative, multi-stakeholder, civil-society venture. It could have greater
legitimacy in the public's mind than efforts by individual, powerful payors
212 Id. at 440.
213 Id. at 441.
214 Id. at 436-37.
2151 d. at 445.
216 Jackson Williams, Non-governmental health planning: Is the Rochester approach an
alternative to regulatory certificate of need?, 3 HEALTH POL'Y TECH. 185, 191 (2014).
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and avoid the perception that it is choosing arbitrary benchmarks.
Because the commission (hereinafter, LoHMPAC) would have the charge
of ensuring payment adequacy, it would meet the antitrust law's mandate that
a monopsony not result in output reductions that reduce access. Like the
Rochester model, it would not involve naked restraints or an agreement to fix
prices, 217 but it would be expected that payors will individually implement
its recommendations.
A LoHMPAC would have access to information on prices that prevail in
other localities and would therefore have some empirical guidance into the
parameters of price adequacy. Suppose for instance that a LoHMPAC is
convened in a community like Denver, where prevailing prices overall are,
according to Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI), three percent above the
national average .2' s HCCI's Healthy Marketplace Index compendium
indicates that, at the extreme, in Baltimore, prices are thirty-three percent
below the national average. 21 9 The LoHMPAC could set a target based upon
Baltimore or any other metropolitan area with prices below average,
adjusting for geographic differences in input costs (such as wages). A
LoHMPAC would also have access to cost reports that hospitals submit to
Medicare. The panel could also request additional data from providers,
though, as a private-sector body, it would be in no position to demand it.
Like MedPAC, a LoHMPAC could have full-time professional staff
reporting to its voluntary governing body, or it could retain consultants.
Economists would conduct data analysis and make recommendations to
volunteer panel members. They would present their analysis and document
any trade-offs required by lower prices, have to certify no likely material
reduction in output at the recommended prices, and be available to testify in
an antitrust lawsuit. The governing body could hold hearings and give
providers the opportunity to present evidence justifying their current prices.
It may be wise from a legal standpoint to structure the governing body so that
its members do not represent more than thirty-five percent of purchasing
power in the community. However, because reference prices do not imply a
refusal to deal with sellers, only an assertion that the balance between the
RBP and charges must be collected from the patient, the arrangement should
pass legal muster. Reference prices set by a commission would still face the
obstacles confronting RBP by an individual payor, most notably the threat of
balance billing. But the groundwork laid by a commission in recommending
an appropriate price could be recapitulated by the commission's staff or
217 Id.
218 Healthy Marketplace Index, HEALTH CARE COST INST.,
https://www.healthcostinstitute.org/research/hmi (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) (select
"Discovery Health Care Prices and Use In your Area >>", scroll down new page, select
drop-down "How does your area stack up?", select "Your Area", then Select "Denver-
Aurora-Lakewood").
219 Id.
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consultant in defense of a balance billing lawsuit.
Imagine that the commission's review of data concludes that prevailing
prices of 400 percent of Medicare are due to provider concentration and
market power, and that an efficient hospital could function well while
receiving 200 percent. An enrollee is admitted to the hospital in an
emergency, without signing papers agreeing to pay the charges in full. A
participating provider tenders 200 percent, and the hospital brings suit
against the enrollee for the balance. A coalition of payors could arrange to
defend the suit as a test case, and call commission personnel to testify. The
defense could present a virtual antitrust case in miniature against the hospital
without having to prove all elements; as a plaintiff, the hospital would have
the burden of proving the balance due. Clearly, the commission could give
payors an advantage they don't have in a pure, unilateral RBP scenario.
A LoHMPAC would be most effective if convened to settle an antitrust
lawsuit by consumers or payors (or government officials) against providers.
Like a Certificate of Public Advantage remedy, it would have the power of a
court or regulator behind it. Hiring staff or consultants for a LoHMPAC
would put at payors' or state attorney generals' disposal experts who could
help prepare, and testify in, proactive antitrust litigation.
C. Reference Pricing and Insurance
Efforts to impose reference pricing on providers are complicated by the
bifurcated nature of health insurance. Self-insured employer health plans are
regulated under ERISA which, as noted earlier, does not have network
adequacy requirements. Fully insured plans are regulated by states, and in the
case of Qualified Health Plans 2 20 in the ACA's individual market, by the
federal government. State laws and the ACA impose network adequacy
requirements. Under the ACA, individual market QHPs are explicitly
structured as network-based products, that is, the consumer is purchasing
access to healthcare within a PPO or HMO network, and there is no provision
221for indemnity-style insurance.
The upshot is that under current law governing insurance, there is limited
latitude for reference pricing to supplant network contracting with providers.
Changes in state and federal law could permit reference prices to further
spread within the fully insured market, but without such revisions, some
providers would have the option of shifting costs onto insurer-payors.
If unified employers were to impose reference pricing on providers, one
presumes that their intent would be for that pressure to lower providers'
overall costs and for lower prices to spill over into fully insured products.
But because of network adequacy laws, insurers would still have to come to
220 42 U.S.C. § 18021 (2010).
221 42 U.S.C. § 18003 (2010).
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terms with providers on prices, permitting providers to mount resistance and
pass on costs to insurers and, ultimately, on to the federal government.
This scenario would be most likely to occur in markets where a single
hospital or health system predominates. A dominant provider would have
two options other than capitulation on reference pricing (option one being to
balance bill members of ERISA plans). The cost-shifting option would be to
demand higher prices from insurers. This in turn would increase health
insurance premiums. The reaction of employers might be to drop out of the
small-group market. Some might be able to self-insure or join Association
Health Plans to take advantage of RBP, but others might leave their
employees to the ACA individual market. In the ACA market, the majority
of consumers have been subsidized and are held harmless for premium
increases; instead, the government absorbs the higher prices.
While structural and legal factors favor the provider in this scenario,
public relations and political factors might not. A provider refusing to accede
to pressure would face a backlash from middle- and upper-class consumers
ineligible for subsidies. Not-for-profit hospitals, whose tax exemptions
always place them in a somewhat adversarial position with local
governments and state revenue departments, would be vulnerable to
complaints addressed to those entities arguing that the provider is deviating
from its not-for-profit mission. Further, a drop in insurance enrollment could
result in a hospital providing more uncompensated care.
The dynamics would be somewhat different in markets with multiple
providers. An insurer could contract with a narrow network yet permit
enrollees to use other providers, as a point-of-service option, at the reference
price. For non-network providers, this arrangement would resemble a
unilateral contract offering by the insurer that providers could accept on
either a blanket or ad-hoc basis if they decided, after rejecting a network
contract offer, to undercut their in-network competitor to win back volume.
Such providers could advertise to enrollees their willingness to provide
services and accept the reference price as payment in full.
D. Reference Pricing's Incompatibility With Payment Reforms
In recent years, public and private payors, including employers, have been
implementing alternative payment models (APMs). In APMs, providers, or
groups of providers, assume responsibility for the total costs of care for a
population (as in an accountable care organization, or ACO) or for an episode
of care (called a bundled payment).222 These arrangements presuppose a
significant level of cooperation and trust between provider and payor. They
involve a commitment by the payor to direct all, or much, of their health care
expenditures to the provider group in exchange for that group's willingness
222 Jackson Williams, The CAS Innovation Center's Expansion Authority and the Logic of
Payment Reform Through Rulemaking, 40 J. HEALTH HUM. SERVS. ADMiN. 3, 6-7 (2017).
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to take on risk. They require a joint dedication to move away from the
paradigm of fee-for-service billing that is lucrative for providers and broad
access to providers that many, if not most, American workers have come to
expect from their employer health plans. Under APMs, savings in health care
costs arise from reduced utilization.
Imposition of reference pricing upon providers would surely undermine
the spirit of cooperation necessary to implement APMs. A decision to pursue
RBP almost certainly implies a decision to continue fee-for-service medicine.
In turn that implies some ability of providers to generate more procedures
and patient encounters to replace lost income, meaning that RBP may also
require managed care techniques such as prior authorization and utilization
review that both providers and patients can find onerous. A decision to pursue
RBP presumes a determination that prices, not utilization, are the culprit in
high health care costs (a determination that would square with the opinion of
most health care experts) 223 and that cooperative efforts to reduce utilization
can be sacrificed.
CONCLUSION
To pursue RBP means accepting trade-offs and risking unintended
consequences; the potential for impasses impacting patient access is only the
tip of the iceberg. But RBP is also a way that employers can send a strong
message that business-as-usual will not be tolerated and perhaps begin a
movement toward lower health care costs. Private sector initiatives in this
area, by shaking up the status quo, could force the hand of policymakers and
stakeholders in addressing high costs. In the author's view, it is certainly
worth experimenting with collective payor action to lower prices in
appropriate high-cost localities.
"Why wouldn't everyone do it?" Clearly, the appetite for RBP is weaker
than one might have expected. In Montana, county and municipal employee
health plans have imposed the same terms on hospitals that the state Health
Care and Benefits Division did, but other payers and third party
administrators have not, despite the fact that hospitals seemingly revealed a
willingness to accept those rates.224 A 1992 Wall Street Journal article
reported that the Memphis Business Group on Health planned to evolve its
group purchasing cooperative to encompass the establishment of "its own
'fair and reasonable' price schedule, 225 but this appears not to have come to
pass. Harvard researchers who interviewed a dozen benefit executives for
large employers reported "Four key themes characterized employer
223 HEALTH CARE COST INST., 2017 HEALTH CARE COST AND UTILIZATION REPORT 3 (2019).
224 Montana House Bill 747 (Adjourned Sine Die), LEGISCAN,
https://legiscan.com/MT/bill/HB747/2019 (last visited Nov. 14, 2019); See H.B. 747, 66th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2019) (detailing H.B 747); Bartlett, supra note 193.
225 Ron Winslow, Strong Medicine: How Local Businesses Got Together to Cut Memphis
Health Costs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at Al.
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perspectives on adoption of RBP: (1) Although cognizant of its potential,
very few employers have implemented RBP; (2) There are concerns about
the complexity of RBP, employee risk of catastrophic out-of-pocket costs,
and need for significant communication and decision support; (3) The
business case for RBP is not compelling; and (4) Adoption of RBP may
hinder retention of and competition for workers. 2 26 Note that the informants
expressed these sentiments with regard to the more conservative CalPERS
model, not the expansive, riskier Montana model.
Some state insurance commissioners have expressed curiosity about the
applicability of reference pricing to plans under theirjurisdiction. Regulators
should tread carefully in carving out exceptions to network adequacy
requirements since doing so risks impasses, confusing consumers with
unfamiliar plan designs, and gaming by providers. However, state regulators
should consider participating alongside employers in coordinated localized
demonstration projects.
226 Anna D. Sinaiko et al., Why Aren 't More Employers Implementing Reference-Based
Pricing Benefit Design?, 25 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 85, 86 (2019).
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